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This paper is a study about how to set the reserve price in auction theory, using
the data collected by Thematic Database for Human-earth System, which is about the
land auction in China, to analyze how government chooses the reserve price in land
auction and the factors that may affect the value of reserve price. In auction theory,
reserve price is irrelevant with the number of bidders under sealed-bid English
auction, and it is only decided by bidders’ private value function. If the bids during
the auction are the public information for bidders, then such information may affect
bidders’ private value function, which in turn changes bidders’ final bids and their
revenue expectation. This paper summarizes the study related with auction theory
and empirical analysis of auction data, researching the factors that affect reserve
price and how they work based on the land auction data in China. Define two new
variables called competition variable and premium, and then set up several
econometric models to test and verify two main hypotheses proposed in this paper.
According to the outcomes regressed by econometric models, we find that
reserve price is correlated with the competition among bidders positively in land
auction. Meanwhile, reserve price is correlated with premium positively, which
means government will estimate the distribution of bidders’ private value function
based on historical auction data, and use such estimation to set a proper reserve price
in order to maximize its expected revenue. Compared with other 5 usage of land,
government tend to choose a lower value of reserve price for industrial land in
transaction, in order to reach a lower bargain price.
The innovation in this paper is that it chooses a different aspect to analyze the
land auction in China, researching how government chooses the best reserve price in
transaction which in order to improve its revenue and therefore the financial revenue
of land.
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